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THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: NO STANDARD FOR MALPRACTICE
Jean E. Faure* and R. Keith Strong**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal malpractice claims are occuring with increasing frequency. Nationwide, there have been "more reported appellate decisions [pertaining to attorney malpractice] in the last fifteen years
than in the preceding seventy years." 1 A similiar situation exists in
Montana. In the first eight months of 1985, seventy individuals
filed professional malpractice claims. 2 Concomitantly, in the past
two years, legal malpractice insurance companies have increased by
300 percent the premiums charged lawyers. 3 Montana's problem is
particularly alarming because the state reputedly has one of the
worst loss ratios in the nation." Montana's courts can expect to
face more questions about the nature and extent of an attorney's
duty to a client. One question certain to arise is the new Model
Rules' effect on that duty.
Montana case law defines the nature of an attorney's duty to
his client as one of reasonable care or skill.5 In defining this duty,
the Montana Supreme Court has never considered whether a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility' or the new Model
Rules of Professional Conduct7 indicates a failure to meet that
standard of care. Montana courts have not discussed the Code or
Model Rules as a measure of an attorney's duty to his client. Montana's Code has been used exclusively in disclipinary actions.8
In cases unrelated to malpractice, courts have consistently
* B.A., Carroll College, 1981; M.A., Creighton University, 1983; J.D., University of
Montana School of Law, 1986.
** Partner with Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, Great Falls, Montana. J.D. (with
high honors), University of Montana School of Law, 1974.
1. R. MALLEN & V. LEvr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 18 (2d ed. 1981).
2. State Bar Insurance Committee, State Bar Of Montana, Professional Liability
Claim Data (August 31, 1985) (available from George Bousliman, Executive Director of the

State Bar).
3.
4.
5.

Tirrell, Malpractice Insurance: An Overview, 2 MONT.LAW. 6-7 (January 1986).
Id.
Clinton v. Miller, 124 Mont. 463, 226 P.2d 487 (1951).

6. AMERICAN BAR
[hereinafter CODE].
7. AMERICAN BAR

ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1969)

(1983)

[here-

ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

inafter MODEL RULES].
, 704 P.2d 1019 (1985); Matter of Keller,
8. See Petition of Gillham, Mont. __
Mont. -, 693 P.2d 1211 (1984); Matter of Wyse, - Mont. -, 688 P.2d 758
(1984); Matter of McKeon, Mont. , 656 P.2d 179 (1982).
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used the Code." For example, courts routinely take into account
Code provision DR 2-106 in determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees.1" Suits involving attorney's fees, however, are not
based on negligence. This is also true in cases involving false or
misleading advertising. 1 An attorney's representations may create
a warranty upon which a client may base a cause of action; but a
lawsuit arising out of those representations would be strictly a contract action. 2 Thus, judicial references to the Code in these instances have no bearing on the negligence concepts involved in legal malpractice suits.
Historically, the Code has failed to provide significant assistance in negligence actions.'" A number of courts have resoundingly rejected the use of the Code in legal malpractice litigation
and concluded that a violation of the Code does not create a pri4
vate cause of action.1
More recently, however, a few courts have held that a proven
violation of the Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice."6 While
recognizing that the Code fails to define standards for civil liability, these courts have found that a violation of the Code "certainly
constitutes some evidence of the standards required of
attorneys."' 6
This article examines the historical use of the Code in legal
malpractice cases and analyzes the Model Rules to determine their
distinctions from the Code in terms of format, focus, and substance. In this light, the article tests the Model Rules as a prescribed standard of conduct similar to that of a penal statute. Fi9. Cherney v. Moody, 413 So. 2d 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (formulation of procedural rules); In re E. Sugar Antitrust Litig., 697 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1982) (disgorgement of
fees); Rode v. Branca, 481 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (recission of contract); O'Dowd v.
Johnson, 666 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (recovery of debt); United States v. Jamil,
546 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1983) (suppression of
evidence).
10. Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1982).
11. People v. Roehl, 655 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983) (en bane).
12. MALLEN, supra note 1, at 182.
13. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978), aff'd, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.
1983); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d
438 (1980); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220
Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
14. Id.
15. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
888 (1980); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Lipton v.
Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App.
78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
16. Woodruff, 616 F.2d at 936; See also Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65
Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891
(1974).
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nally, the article concludes that the Model Rules act best as a
complement to common law negligence. By their very nature impractical as a concrete standard of care, the Model Rules regulate a
delicate tripartite balance between the court, the attorney, and the
client. Using the Model Rules to create a private cause of action
destroys that balance.
II.

AN

OVERVIEW OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE

In simplest terms, legal malpractice is negligence. "It is the
failure to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of tasks they undertake.' 1 7 As with any negligence action, a plaintiff must prove that the attorney owed him a duty of
care, that the attorney breached his duty by failing to use reasonable care and skill, that the breach of the duty proximately caused
the plaintiff's injury, and that the breach resulted in damages.18
When attorney negligence lies in the breach of a duty of professional care, the quality of conduct "customarily" provided by
the members of that profession defines the attorney's duty. 9 Thus,
the degree of departure from customary professional conduct determines the breach rather than a reference to the traditional reasonable man standard. In George v. Caton,20 the court provided a
concise statement of the standard of care applicable in legal malpractice actions:
When a lawyer contracts to prosecute actions on behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that he possesses the requisite degree
of learning, skill and ability necessary to practice his profession
which others similarly situated ordinarily possess, that he will exert his best judgment in prosecution of litigation entrusted to
him, and that he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in the use and application of his knowledge to his client's cause.21
The standard of conduct is premised upon the skill and care
ordinarily exercised by attorneys, criteria rarely within the common knowledge of jurors. Even a plaintiff who proves a violation of
an ethical rule must still prove a violation of the standard of con17.
Gelfand,
18.
19.
of Clovis
20.
21.

7A C.J.S. Attorney-Client § 255 (1980). Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart &
6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
Scott v. Robson, 182 Mont. 528, 535-36, 597 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1979).
Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 878, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (1984); First Nat'l Bank
v. Diane, Inc., 102 N.M. 548, 553, 698 P.2d 5, 9 (1985).
93 N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822 (1979).
Id. at 376, 600 P.2d at 828.
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duct. 22 Obviously, proof of the standard of conduct necessitates ex-

pert testimony. 3 Without expert testimony, there is no basis upon
which to fault the attorney's conduct.
A legislative enactment may prescribe the standard of conduct
required of a reasonable, prudent individual.24 Such a statute
would establish a standard for determining negligence by dictating
a course of action under a given set of circumstances, and indicating that a deviation from the standard would be negligence. 25 Although the drafters of such statutes rarely intend to affect tort liability, the statutory standard is adopted as the standard of care. 26
Some statutes fail to create a duty of conduct toward the person injured.2 Since a negligence action does not exist unless the
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff, these statutes fail to afford
protection. 6 Other statutes only protect the interests of the state,
or the community as a whole.2 9 In Nehring v. LaCounte,30 for instance, the Montana Supreme Court held that the legislature intended that the alcoholic beverage control statutes "protect the
people of the state generally and the interests of the state rather
than . . .against any particular kind of injury or provide a civil

remedy."31 Moreover, statutory protection may extend only to a
limited class in which the plaintiff must fall to maintain an action
based on the statute.3 2
Once a court determines that an applicable statute has been
violated, it will generally find negligence conclusively established."3
In Azure v. City of Billings, " the plaintiff sued the Billings Police
Department for failing to take him to an emergency medical ser22. ABC Trans Nat'l Transp., Inc. v. Aeronautic Forwarders, Inc., 90 Ill.
App. 3d 817,
830-31, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1310-11 (1980).
23. MALLEN, supra note 1, at 843-47. Cf. House v. Maddox, 46 111.App. 3d 68, 360
N.E.2d 580 (1977) (allowing statute of limitations to run indicates such "obvious and explicit carelessness" that expert testimony is not needed to prove "that which is already
abundantly clear"). See also Breslin & McMonigle, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Attorneys, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 119 (1980).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965). Konow v. Southern Pac. Co., 105
Ariz. 386, 465 P.2d 366 (1970).
25. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 at 220 (5th ed. 1984).
26. Id.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 comment c, § 286.
28. W. KEETON, supra note 25, at 222. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288
(1965).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288.
30. Mont. ,712 P.2d 1329 (1986).
31. Id. at __, 712 P.2d at 1333.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 comment f.
33. W. KEETON, supra note 25, at 230. In such cases, a breach of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence per se.
34. 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460 (1979).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/4

4

1986]
Faure
and Strong: The Model RulesMALPRACTICE
of Professional Conduct: No Standard for Malpractice

vice, as required by Montana statute. The court in Azure held the
City negligent as a matter of law.35 Noting the effect of a statutory
violation, the court stated:
[I]t is the general rule that where a statute makes a requirement
or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person or class of persons,
one injured by reason of a violation of it is entitled to maintain an
action against him by whose disobedience he has suffered
injury;
36
and this is true whether the statute is penal or not.
To avail himself of this rule, the plaintiff must demonstrate
"(1) that he is a member of the class in whose favor the statute
imposes a duty; and (2) that the defendant is a member of the
class upon whom the legislature imposed the duty. ' 37 If a plaintiff
fails to demonstrate the existence of these factors, courts generally
interpret a violation of a statute as mere evidence of negligence.3 8
In Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co.,3 9 the court held that the National Electric Safety Code creates only evidence of a standard of
care to be considered in determining negligence. In Nehring,0 the
court held that because the legislature intended alcoholic beverage
control statutes to protect the people of the state generally, a violation "may be relevant in determining whether a defendant's con1
duct was negligent.
Courts treat a violation of a statute or ordinance differently
than a violation of a standard specified in an administrative regulation. 2 In Stepanek v. Kober Construction," the court held that
violations of administrative regulations should be considered as evidence of negligence.
Unlike statutes or administrative regulations, the Model Rules
are promulgated by the ABA, not representative bodies. Enforcement is based on a procedure unique to the legal profession." Intended to do more than protect the general welfare of the public,
the Model Rules establish a balance between the court, attorneys,
35. Id. at 241, 596 P.2d at 465.
36. Id. at 240, 596 P.2d at 464 (citing Conway v. Monidah Trust, 47 Mont. 269, 132 P.
26 (1913)).
37. Id. at 240-41, 596 P.2d at 464.
38. W. KEETON, supra note 25, at 222-24.
39. Mont.-, 657 P.2d 594 (1983).
40. Mont.-_, 712 P.2d 1329 (1986).
41. Id. at -, 712 P.2d at 1333.
42. "The general rule has been to consider the violation as merely evidence of negligence." Stepanek v. Kober Construction, Mont. -,
625 P.2d 51, 56 (1981). See
-,
also Cash v. Otis Elevator, Mont. , 684 P.2d 1041 (1984).
43. Mont.-., 625 P.2d 51 (1981).
44. See RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, MONTANA LAWYERS DESKBOOK
129 (1985).
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and clients. The Montana Supreme Court adopted the Model
Rules by court order, pursuant to its authority to make rules governing procedure and practice before the courts. 5 Examining this
constitutional authority, the Montana Supreme Court stated in
Matter of McCabe:46 "As to rules which might be promulgated by
the Court relative to practice, admission to the Bar, and conduct ' 4'of7
members of the Bar, the legislature is given no veto authority.
Thus, the Model Rules must even be distinguished from the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure and the Montana Rules of Evidence,
48
which are subject to legislative disproval.
The nature of the Model Rules remains unclear. It is easier to
determine what they are not. Because they lack a legislative base,
the Model Rules are not statutes, ordinances, or municipal regulations. A product of the judiciary, they are not administrative regulations. Hence, courts cannot easily define the role of the Model
Rules in legal malpractice actions. Because of the Model Rules'
unique character, courts encounter difficulty analogizing a violation of the Model Rules to a violation of a safety statute.
III.

THE

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1969, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides three types of
standards: the Canons, the Ethical Considerations, and the Disciplinary Rules.4 9 The Canons, "axiomatic norms," offer general
statements of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationship with the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. 50 The Ethical Considerations, more concrete but still "aspirational in character, . . . represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive." 51 The Disciplinary
Rules, "mandatory in character, . . . state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
'52
disciplinary action.
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the Code, but not the
45.
46.
47.
48.

§ 2(3).
168 Mont. 334, 544 P.2d 825 (1975).
Id. at 339, 544 P.2d at 828.
Id. The Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure are subject to disapproval by the
MONT. CONST. art. VII,

legislature; the CODE and MODEL RULES are not.

49.

ABA

50.

PREAMBLE

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
AND

PRELIMINARY

STATEMENT,

ABA

MODEL

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY.

51.
52.

Id.
Id.
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Ethical Considerations, in 1975.13 Until the summer of 1985, Mon54
tana courts exclusively used the Code in disciplinary proceedings.
The inherent power of the judiciary gives the Montana Supreme
Court the jursidiction to enforce the Code. 55 To this end, the court
established the Commission on Practice in 1965.56
The Code has been innovatively suggested as a standard of lia5 7
bility in legal malpractice actions but almost universally rejected.
In Bickel v. Mackie, 8 a physician, a successful defendant in a prior
medical malpractice suit, sued his former patient and her attorney
for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent practice of
law, and failure to comply with the Code. Analogizing the Code to
drivers' rules of the road which, if violated, constitute negligence
per se, the plaintiff argued that the attorney owed him a duty to
comply with the Code. 9 The court disagreed, stating:
Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics is not tantamount to
a tortious act, particularly with regard to liability to a non-client.
Though Canon 7 does speak of a duty 'to the legal system' to stay
within the bounds of the law when representing clients, it does
not create a private cause of action.60
Many courts cite the preliminary statement of the Code
which explicitly states that the Code does not "undertake to define
standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct." 61
In Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Ro loff,62 the plaintiff, a used car
dealer and successful defendant in a previous action, sued two attorneys for misleading the court with false statement of facts. The
53. Supreme Court Order No. 12500, Code of Professional Responsibility (April 25,
1973) (available from Ethel Harrison, Clerk of Supreme Court, State of Montana).
54. On June 6, 1985, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The court substantially adopted the ABA's Model Rules, but modified Rule
1.5(a), Rule 3.6, Rule 7.3, and Rule 7.4. The court adopted neither the Preamble nor the
Comments to the ABA Model Rules. See Patterson, Supreme Court Adopts Model Rules,
11 MONT. LAW. 18 (Sept. 1985). RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, MONTANA LAWYERS
DESKBOOK 136 (1985).
55. MONT.CONST. art.

56.

VII, § 2(3).

The Montana Supreme Court appoints eleven members-eight lawyers and three

non-lawyers-to serve on the commission. RULES

FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,

supra note 44, at 129, for an outline of the commission's powers and duties.
57. Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions
Against Attorneys, 9 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1982); Portuondo, Ethical Standards and Tax
Law, 22 TRIAL 48, 51 (1986).
58. 447 F. Supp 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978), afl'd 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 1383.
60. Id.

61.

PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT,

ABA

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY.

62.

291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981).
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court in Roloff held that an attorney's violation of the Code does
not give rise to a private cause of action for damages.6 3 The court
noted the principal reasons for this ruling:
(a) The statute or Code of Professional Responsibility was not
intended to create a private cause of action. On the contrary, the
sole intended remedy for a violation of such a statute or code is the
imposition of discipline by disbarment, suspension, or reprimand
of the offending attorney.
(b) Other remedies, such as malicious prosecution, adequately
protect the public from harassment or abuse by unprofessional
lawyers.
(c) To expose attorneys to actions for damages for breach of
ethical duties imposed by such statutes and codes would be contrary to the "obvious public interest" in affording every citizen
"the utmost freedom of access to the courts.""4
Most cases which reject the use of the Code to expand liability
arise in the context of malicious prosecution. 5 Because these suits
potentially expand a lawyer's duty beyond his client, courts may
be reluctant to impose liability based on the Code. As the court in
Brody v. Ruby6 stated:
The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers addresses the various concerns which confront a lawyer in his or her
relationship with a client, the justice system, and the public in
general . . . . The lawyer's obligation to represent his or her client
zealously within the bounds of the law ... coupled with the basic
adversary nature of the legal profession . . . must be accompanied by immunity from liability for negligence in an action by a
successful adverse litigant. 7
These limited circumstances may preclude the use of the Code
as a basis for negligence. In a malicious prosecution action, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument that "negligence
might be founded upon a duty owed to the opposing party under
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 6 8 Obviously, liability
based on the Code would pit its provisions against one another: the
duty of zealous representation could become unduly tempered by
63. Id. at 334, 630 P.2d at 850.
64. Id. at 331-32, 630 P.2d at 848 (citations omitted).
65. See Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Bickel, 447 F. Supp. 1376;
Brody, 267 N.W.2d 902; Nelson, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438; Ayyildiz, 220 Va. 1080, 266
S.E.2d 108.
66. 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
67. Id. at 907.
68. Ayyildiz, 220 Va. at 1085, 266 S.E.2d at 112.
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the specter of countersuits based on this expanded duty. Moreover,
rejection of the Code does not leave the third party without a remedy. 9 His remedy is through an action for malicious prosecution. 7
Some courts base their refusal to use the Code on the remedy
issue. In Nelson v. Miller,71 a physician brought a retaliatory suit
against attorneys who had unsuccessfully represented plaintiffs in
an action against him, alleging that the attorneys negligently failed
to investigate the medical malpractice claim. While the court
seemed to equate a violation of the Code with "professional negligence," it stated:
We believe that the public is adequately protected from harassment and abuse by an unprofessional member of the bar through
the means of the traditional cause of action for malicious prosecution. . . . The remedy provided a third-party adversary is solely
72
through an action for malicious prosecution of a civil action.
Courts view the remedy for a violation of the Code as a
"public" one. In Martin v. Trevino,7 3 the Texas Court of Appeals
held that a breach of the standard of professional responsibility
does not create a private cause of action. Instead, an injured party
may attain redress through imposition of disciplinary measures.7 4
"The remedy provided . . .for the professional misconduct of an
attorney is a public one, not a private one."'75 The court reasoned
that because the Code provides protection for the public, a viola76
tion cannot result in a private cause of action.
Some courts recently have abandoned their traditional reticence in using the Code as a source of professional standards for
malpractice.7 7 In Woodruff v. Tomlin,78 the plaintiff retained Tomlin to represent the plaintiff's daughters in a personal injury suit
arising from an automobile accident. After losing the personal injury suit, plaintiff-Woodruff contended that Tomlin negligently
handled the case and breached his fiduciary duties arising from the
69. See, e.g., Nelson, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438.
70. See Id.
71. 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
72. Id. at 288-89, 607 P.2d at 451.
73. 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
74. Id. at 770.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Woodruff, 616 F.2d 924; Kinnamon v. Staitman & Synder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136
Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977); Lysick, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406; Ishmael, 241 Cal.
App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592; Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill.
App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979), aff'd 81 IIl. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Hansen, 14
Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238.
78. 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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attorney-client relationship. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged a conflict of interest in the fact that Tomlin represented (1) the insurance company; (2) the plaintiff himself; (3) the driver-Patricia
Woodruff; and (4) the passenger-Joan Woodruff. Because Joan, as
passenger, had a potential claim against her sister Patricia, plaintiffs argued "it was malpractice for Tomlin to continue to re7' 9
present Joan.
While acknowledging that the Code fails to define standards
for civil liability, the court in Woodrufff held that the Code "certainly constitutes some evidence of the standards required of attorneys."8 0 The court allowed the plaintiffs to present expert testimony as to "whether Joan suffered any injury in fact as a result of
Tomlin's failure to advise her father of the potential conflict of interest inherent in his representation of all three plaintiffs.""
In contrast, some courts analogize the Code to criminal statutes and hold that a violation of the Code is rebuttable evidence of
malpractice. In Lipton v. Boesky,82 former clients based their suits
on several violations of the Code, including misconduct and failure
to represent competently and zealously. Finding the situation analogous to that in criminal law and the law of torts, the court stated:
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a standard. . . of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Holding a
specific client unable to rely on the same standards in his professional relations with his own attorney would be patently unfair. 8
Suits based on conflicts of interest comprise an increasing area
of malpractice, and one in which courts increasingly rely on the
Code. 4 In Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund and
Belom,8 5 the defendant law firm settled a medical malpractice action without the consent or knowledge of its client Rogers. Rogers
sued, arguing that the law firm breached its duty of representation.
Refering specifically to Canon 5 of the Code, the court found "it
would be anomalous indeed to hold that professional standards of
79.

Id. at 935.

80. Id. at 936.
81. Id. at 936-37.
82. 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981).
83. Id. at 597-98, 313 N.W.2d at 166-67.
84. See Woodruff, 616 F.2d 924; Ishmael, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592;
Lysick, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406; Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md.
App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969).
85. 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979), aff'd 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47
(1980). In Rogers, the interests of the insurer and insured were discordant. The insurance
company preferred settlement but, Rogers, the insured, did not.
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ethics are not relevant considerations in a tort action, but are in a
disciplinary proceeding."8 Since malpractice suits and disciplinary
proceedings involve conduct which falls below minimum standards,
87
the court found the Code to be equally relevant in each.
IV.

THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Since the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct in 1983, no court has addressed their role
in legal malpractice. The ABA drafted the Model Rules to remedy
the inherent problems of the Code which had become unresponsive
to the complexities of legal practice.18 The three-tiered structure
posed problems as legal commentary interpreting the Code frequently blurred the distinctions.
The Code's ethical considerations, though only "aspirational,"
substantively comment on the disciplinary rules and their rationale.89 Courts refer to the Canons' precepts to find mandatory duties not expressly stated in the Disciplinary Rules.90 The standards
do not address conflicts of interest with regard to former clients
nor do they consider nonlitigative situations. As commentators
note, "the standards of conduct reflected in the Canons . . . are

rooted in the 19th Century era of the individualized practitioner."91 The Model Rules functionally approach the problems of
legal practice and separately treat the many different roles of a
lawyer. Beyond organization and format, the Model Rules evince
substantive changes. The drafters broadened the scope of
mandatory and permissive disclosure; they addressed the unique
ethical requirements involved in representing a corporation; they
particularized the rule of imputed disqualification; and they supplanted the Code with affirmative responsibilities of competence,
diligence, and communication. 2
Like the Code, the Model Rules "define proper conduct for
purposes of professional discipline." ' s Similarly, the drafters stated
86. Id. at 473, 392 N.E.2d at 1371.
87. Id.

88. G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HOADES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT XXiX-Xxxi (1985).
89. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6, EC 7-21, EC 7-24, EC
7-33.
90. Walter, An Overview of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 24 WASHBURN
L.J. 443, 452 (1985).
91. Id. at 451.
92. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.3, Rule 1.7 (organization as client), Rule 3.1 (broadening disclosure); Rule 1.10, Rule 1.11, Rule 1.12 (imputed
disqualification), Rule 1.13; Rule 1.1, Rule 1.3, Rule 1.4 (affirmative duties).
93. PREAMBLE, ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
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explicitly that a "[v]iolation of a Rule should not give rise to a
cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal
duty has been breached. The Rules . . . are not designed to be a
' 94
basis for civil liability.
V.

THE MODEL RULES AS A STANDARD OF CIVIL LIABILITY

In a nutshell, the issue facing courts in recent decisions asks:
"If a lawyer can be disciplined under the standards of the Model
Rules, why should the Model Rules not be relevant in a civil case
protecting the client?" 95 Applying disciplinary standards in civil
cases ignores the reasoning of their drafters." Application of the
Model Rules fails to deal with the unique nature of the disciplinary rules for lawyers; it risks distortion of the effect of the Model
Rules. These risks become clearer when comparing the disciplinary
use of the Model Rules with their use in a civil malpractice suit.
As a code of professional conduct, the Model Rules are unique:
The Supreme Court of the State of Montana ... declares that it
possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction and responsibility
under Art. VII, § 2(3), 1972 Montana Constitution and the provisions of Chapter 6, Title 37, Montana Code Annotated, in addition to its inherent jurisdiction, in all matters involving admission
of persons to practice law in the State of Montana, and the con9
duct of disciplining of such persons. 7
No other profession has its disciplinary rules both adopted and enforced by the highest judicial authority in the state."
The enforcement procedure is unique as well." The Montana
Supreme Court appoints the enforcing body from among lawyers
and lay people. 100 This Commission acts in the name of the Supreme Court. 10 1 It appoints representatives for people who have
filed complaints.10 2 The proceedings are sui generis by definition;
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 73.
Rogers, 74 111.App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365.
PREAMBLE, ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.

97.

PREAMBLE, RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 44, at 129.
98. For instance, accountants rely on ethical rules promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The Montana Board of Public Accountants adopts
rules of professional conduct. By statute, a violation of these rules is a misdemeanor. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-50-101 to -342 (1985).
99. Rules 7-27, RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 44, at 130-

35.
100. Rule 1, RULES
101.

FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note

44, at 129.

Id.

102. Rule 4 and 9C,

RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra

note 44, at

130-31.
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they are expressly neither civil nor criminal.' 0 3 Carefully designed
to ensure consideration of the interests of the courts, the complainant, and the lawyer, the proceedings are privileged and inadmissible in any civil lawsuit.10 4 The Supreme Court reviews the results
of the hearings and determines discipline. 10 5 No other profession is
singled out constitutionally for such close judicial scrutiny.
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the Model Rules to aid
the legal system. 10 6 The Model Rules exist to ensure the integrity
of the legal system as a whole by forcefully reminding attorneys
that their first loyalty is to the court. Taking the Model Rules out
of this context removes the motivating force behind them. A legal
malpractice suit neglects the party most involved in and affected
by the professional standards of the Model Rules-the legal system itself. In a legal malpractice suit, however, the court reverts to
its accustomed role as arbiter. The suit focuses on the relationship
between the attorney and the client. Using the Model Rules in this
context renders two harms. First, their use would emphasize only
one aspect of the Model Rules-the attorney/client-to the exclusion of the Model Rules' impact on the legal system. Second, their
use would encourage attorneys to elevate those Model Rules which
relate to the attorney-client relationship. Attorneys would thereby
distance themselves from the court system and consider more important their relationship with clients than their relationship with
the legal system.
Significantly, a number of the Model Rules require conduct by
an attorney which a client could perceive as harmful to his own
interest.1 0 7 The Model Rules are designed, in many instances, to
temper an attorney's zeal in representing his clients. 08 To the extent that the Model Rules temper zeal, they foreseeably harm
those clients. For example, Rule 1.6(b) provides in part that "A
lawyer may reveal [information relating to representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or susbstantial bodily
103. Rule 15A, RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 44, at 132.
104. Rule 13, RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 44, at 132.
105. Rule 9E, RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 44, at 131.
106. Supreme Court Order No. 84-303, Rules of Professional Conduct (1985), reprinted in MONTANA LAWYERS DESKBOOK 136 (1985).
107. Rule 3.3, for instance, emphasizes the lawyer's duty to prevent perjury over any
obligation as an advocate. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
108. Rule 1.6, Rule 1.16, Rule 3.2, Rule 3.3, Rule 3.4, Rule 3.5, Rule 4.1 of the RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986

13

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 47
[1986], Iss. 2, Art. 4
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 47

harm ... ."109 Rule 3.3 requires disclosure of adverse authority. 10
Disclosure in these instances could conceiveably harm the client.
But, implicit in these rules is an attorney's overriding duty to the
court system.' The standards of Rule 1.6 and Rule 3.3 interpose a
higher duty: the duty of the attorney to a system of laws and the
duty of a lawyer to the courts which administer those laws.
In determining negligence in a legal malpractice action, jurors
must ask what is reasonable under the circumstances."' Thus,
plaintiffs introduce expert testimony to indicate that under these
particular circumstances the attorney acted unreasonably." s The
Model Rules provide little guidance in a legal malpractice action
precisely because they do not apply to specific circumstances. Indeed, the Model Rules fail to relate to specific instances of conduct
4
at all.1
One example is conflicts of interest. The Model Rules restrict
representation of clients with actual or apparent conflicts." 5 When
attorneys represent a client's fundamental rights, conflicts of interest detract from the appearance of fairness."' A client's faith in his
attorney's loyalty remains essential to confidence in the integrity
of the system.
Proof of a conflict, by itself, does not prove damage to the client in terms of a negligence cause of action. The test still is
whether the attorney appropriately managed the matter at hand.
While attorneys seek to avoid conflicts of interest, the Rule which
proscribes them does not necessarily result in harm to a client. The
rule recognizes the likelihood of misconduct toward one client
when the attorney represents both sides of an issue. But, to establish negligence, a litigant still must prove a specific instance of action or inaction which damages him. 1 7 He must demonstrate that
the task for which the lawyer was engaged was not accomplished
109. Rule 1.6 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54, at 138-39.
110. Rule 3.3, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54, at 142.
111. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
112. Scott, 182 Mont. 528, 597 P.2d 1150.
113. MALLEN, supra note 1, at 843-47.
114. See, e.g., Rule 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54,
at 138.
115. Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54, at
139.
116. In the context of conflicting interests, courts express concern that lawyers should
avoid the "appearance of professional impropriety." Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz.
157, 685 P.2d 1309 (1984).
117. Brosie v. Stockton, 105 Ariz. 574, 577, 468 P.2d 933, 936 (1970). In Woodruff, the
court recognized the attorney's conflict of interest. Nonetheless, the plaintiff had to present
expert testimony on the issue of injury and damage. 616 F.2d at 936-37.
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appropriately. Proof of a conflict of interest merely begs the question of competent representation; it does not address the substance
of whether a lawyer acted competently in the task assigned.
Introducing the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest in a malpractice action shifts the focus from the actual misconduct.11 Use
of the rule adds nothing to a jury's understanding of whether the
attorney exercised reasonable care under the circumstances of handling a matter for a client.
Nonetheless, it is in this area of representing conflicting interests that courts have applied provisions of the Code as a standard
for liability. 1 ' It was not necessary for them to do so. Courts ask
rhetorically why these disciplinary standards cannot also be used
to protect individual plaintiffs. The answer: individual plaintiffs already have specific standards to protect them.
The Model Rule pertaining to conflicts of interest is not an
isolated example. Other Model Rules are also one step removed
from measuring specific incidents of negligence. 120 Rule 1.1 states
that "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."1 2' Inherently vague, the Rule provides no guidance for determining whether particular representation was incompetent. Rule
1.3 states that "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client. 11 22 Again, the Rule necessitates expert testimony to explain the reasonableness of the attorney's representation. The Model Rules act as platitudes rather
than standards of conduct in proving negligence.
The Montana Supreme Court intended the Model Rules to be
read together with the Rules Governing the Commission on Practice.12 Designed to be used in this context, the Model Rules pro118. Focusing on an alleged conflict of interest ignores the critical issue of competent
representation. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. App. 1981).
119. Brosie, 105 Ariz. 574, 468 P.2d 933; Weiner v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 114
Cal. App. 3d 39, 170 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980); Ishmael, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592;
Rogers, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365.
120. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.14, 2.1, 3.1, and 4.4 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF
CONDUCT, supra note 54, at 138-44.
121.

Rule 1.1, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54, at 138.

122. Rule 1.3, RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

supra note 54, at 138.

123. Supreme Court Order No. 84-303, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note
106, at 137. The Montana Supreme Court ordered "By and under the authority vested in
the Supreme Court of the State of Montana in Article VII, § 2(3), we do hereby promulgate
and adopt the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.1 to Rule 8.5 inclusive, attached
hereto as rules governing the conduct of persons admitted to practice law before this Court
and all state courts in the State of Montana." (emphasis added).
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tect the legal system-attorney, client, and the court. The Model
Rules neither add nor detract from the ability of a private litigant
to bring a suit for legal malpractice.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is a compelling reason why the drafters designed neither
the Code nor the Model Rules to create a private cause of action.
The Code and Model Rules are blueprints for the complicated
scheme of the attorney's interlocking duties toward client and
court. Focusing on one end of this interrelationship blurs the view
of the scheme as a whole.
When courts reject the warning of the Model Rules' drafters,
they risk changing the substance of the rules. Plaintiffs, through
the flexible remedies of the common law, already have the tools
necessary to gain their legitimate ends. They need not rely on the
Model Rules as a measure of liability.
The courts and our system of laws, however, have no other
detailed set of rules to protect them. Changing the focus of the
Model Rules deprives all who depend on the courts the integrity of
the judicial system. The Model Rules insure that integrity; they
should be enforced vigorously and exclusively toward that end.
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